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CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT

Averell Smith v. Regents of the
University of California,
4 Cal. 4th 843, No. S006588,
93 D.A.R. 1712 (Feb. 3, 1993).

University Must Provide Activities
Fee Deduction for Students Who
Disagree With Fee-Supported
Causes
In this proceeding, students at the
Berkeley campus of the University of California opposed the manner in which the
mandatory activities fee is used; part of the
income from the fee is used to support
student groups that pursue political and
ideological causes. In considering the constitutionality of the various uses of the fee,
the California Supreme Court noted that
two important principles were in conflict:
the principle that the government may not
compel a person to contribute money to
support political or ideological causes,
and the principle that the Regents, to be
effective, must have considerable discretion to determine how best to carry out the
University's educational mission. The
court noted that "if the Regents decide to
implement educational programs that entail burdens on constitutional rights they
must ensure that the burdens are justified,
and it is clear that they have made no
serious effort to do so."
·
Accordingly, the court concluded that
the only practical way to protect the rights
of dissenting students is to implement the
procedures outlined in Keller v. State Bar,
496 U.S. 1 (1990), and Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
These procedures require the Regents to
identify any groups that are ineligible for
mandatory funding under certain constitutional standards and offer students the option of deducting a corresponding amount
from the mandatory fee. Students who
disagree with the Regents' calculation of
the deduction will be entitled to the procedural safeguards articulated in Keller: "an
adequate explanation of the basis for the
fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to
challenge the amount of the fee before an
impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow
for the amounts reasonably in dispute
while such challenges are pending."
The court also addressed the students'
challenge of the use of the mandatory fee
by the Associated Students of the University of California (ASUC) to lobby state
and municipal governments; issues on
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which the ASUC has lobbied in the past
include a nuclear freeze initiative, public
transportation fares, city investment policy, zoning, rent control, rent discrimination, the use of registration fees to fund
abortions, budget cuts for the University,
and mandatory student fees. The court
agreed that even if the Regents had appointed the ASUC to negotiate with governmental bodies on students' behalf, and
even if the state had a compelling reason
to do so, recent caselaw provides that the
state still could not force unwilling students to subsidize lobbying beyond the
narrow subject matter that justified the
requirement of support. Thus, the court
concluded that the Regents may not collect, from any student who objects, that
portion of the mandatory fee that represents the cost of lobbying governmental
bodies.

CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
Funeral Security Plans v. Board
of Funeral Directors and
Embalmers,
14 Cal. App. 4th 715, 93 D.A.R.
3990, No. C0l 1460
(Mar. 25, 1993).

Appellate Court Interprets
Provisions of State Open
Meeting Act
In this proceeding, Funeral Security
Plans, Inc. (FSP) challenged the trial
court's rejection of its allegations that the
Board repeatedly violated the BagleyKeene Open Meeting Act, Government
Code section 11120 et seq. On March 25,
the Third District Court of Appeal issued
a opinion which affirms in part and reverses in part the trial court's decision.
The court first considered the interpretation of the Act's "pending litigation"
exception, which allows state bodies to
meet in closed session "to confer, and
receive advice, from legal counsel" regarding pending litigation. FSP insisted
that the exception should be construed
strictly, objecting to the Board's routine
discussion of facts presented for the first
time in closed sessions by either staff or
legal counsel. The Board argued that the
traditional scope of the attorney-client
privilege applies to all closed sessions involving pending or threatened litigation.
The court rejected both arguments, finding that "FSP's position offends common
sense and the Board's position violates the
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language, as well as the spirit, of the statutory scheme." The court found that deliberation and decisionmaking are necessary
components of "conferring with" and "receiving advice from" legal counsel. However, the court rejected the Board's proposition that the attorney-client privilege is
as broad in closed sessions as in all other
arenas in which the privilege is invoked,
choosing to leave that issue "to be resolved in a proper case in which the strong
public policy ensuring open discussion
and deliberation is weighed against the
asserted need for the attorney-client privilege."
The court then discussed the Act's requirement that "legal counsel of the state
body shall prepare and submit to it a memorandum stating the specific reasons and
legal authority for the closed session"
whenever the Board meets in private
under the pending litigation exception.
FSP complained that on various occasions
the Board failed to prepare the memorandum, prepared it late, and/or did not include in the memorandum the statutory
authority or the facts and circumstances
justifying the closed session; the Board
responded by asserting a defense of substantial compliance. The court, however,
rejected this defense, finding that a state
body has "the burden of proving a compelling necessity for a closed session."
Accordingly, the court held that the statute
compels legal counsel to describe the existing facts and circumstances which
would prejudice the position of the state
body in the litigation if the discussion
occurred in open session, and found that
the Board did not comply with this requirement in the past.
The court then considered the proper
interpretation of Government Code section 11126( d), which allows a state body
to hold a closed session "to deliberate on
a decision to be reached based upon evidence introduced in a proceeding required
to be conducted pursuant to [the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)]." FSP argued that the exception only applies when
a public hearing has been conducted pursuant to the APA. The court disagreed,
holding that the Board may seek legal
advice and confer with counsel in a closed
session about the propriety of proposed
stipulated settlements, reinstatements, and
disciplinary proceedings, as long as there
is "a demonstrated prejudice to the public
by open discussion." The court indicated
that proving the purported prejudice to the
Board's litigation posture would be more
difficult when the Board is discussing a
settlement of a disciplinary charge, as
compared to when there is an ongoing
investigation before litigation is initiated,
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or when the Board is involved in civil
litigation.
The final issue considered by the court
is whether the Board's two-member advisory committees constitute "state bodies"
subject to the Act's open meeting requirements. The Board-which was represented in this litigation by the Attorney
General's Office-argued that its twomember advisory committees may meet in
private, relying in part on the language of
Government Code section 11121.8, which
states that the term state body "also means
any advisory board, advisory commission,
advisory committee, advisory subcommittee, or similar multimember advisory
body of a state body, if created by formal
action of the state body or of any member
of the state body, and if the advisory body
so created consists of three or more persons." FSP, counting the attendance of
Executive Officer James Allen at the committee meetings, argued that the committees had three members and were thus
subject to the Act under section 11121.8.
The court rejected this argument, finding
that Allen's attendance to answer questions and assist in the handling of matters
before the committee did not make him a
member of the committee.
However, despite the specific application of section 11121.8 to advisory committees-the type of committee here at issue,
the court concluded that the Board's advisory committees are also subject to the Act
under the much broader Government Code
section 11121. 7; that section states that the
term state body "also means any board, commission, committee, or similar multimember body on which a member of a body
which is a state body pursuant to section
11121, 11121.2, or 11121.5 serves in his or
her official capacity as a representative of
such state body and which is supported, in
whole or in part, by funds provided by the
state body, whether such body is organized
and operated by the state body or by a private
corporation." The court found support for
this position in a 1982 Attorney General's
Opinion which found that meetings of the
State Board of the California Community
College Student Government Association
(CCCSGA) are subject to the Act because
some of CCCSGA' s governing board members are members of the local student association, which does constitute a state body;
according to the Attorney General, "when a
second body is financed by a 'state body,'
and a member thereof QJ.lil member serves on
that second body, the open meeting requirements attach to and follow that member to
the second body." [ I 3: I CRLR l]
Following the court's decision, the
Board filed a petition for rehearing; on
April 26, the court granted the Board's
226
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motion. At this writing, the rehearing has
yet to be scheduled.

Warfield v. Peninsula Golf
and Country Club,
12 Cal. App. 4th 178, 93 D.A.R.
437, No. A051828 (Jan. 8, 1993).
Unruh Civil Rights Act Does Not
Apply To Discriminatory Practices
of a Private Country Club
Peninsula Golf and County Club is a
nonprofit recreational club located in San
Mateo, which provides for the use of its
members and invited guests a golf course,
driving range, putting greens, golf and
tennis courts, locker rooms, clubhouse,
restaurant, bars, conference rooms, and
other facilities. Although several different
classes of membership are available, the
only proprietary membership is the "regular family membership," which is limited
to 350 members. In March 1970, the bylaws of the club were amended to provide
that regular family memberships "shall be
issued only in the name of adult male
person. Proposals for regular family memberships shall not be approved for females
or minors." The bylaws further state that
upon termination of the marriage of a reg-·
ular family member by divorce or annulment, "the Husband shall continue to be
the Regular Family Member, and all
rights, privileges and obligations shall be
his. In the event of an award of the Certificate of Regular Family Membership in
final judicial action to the female spouse,
and the male spouse does not forthwith
thereafter purchase the female spouse's
interest in the Regular Family Membership, such membership may, by action of
the Board [of Directors], be terminated."
Appellant became interested in the
club through her participation in.golf tournaments, and suggested to her husband in
1970 that a membership would be "great
for the family." Subsequently, a regular
family membership was approved by the
Board and issued in the name of
appellant's husband; appellant was not
then aware that women were precluded by
the bylaws from becoming proprietary
members of the club.
In February 1981, appellant and her
husband divorced, appellant being
awarded "all right, title and interest in and
to the membership of Dr. and Mrs. Warfield in the Peninsula Golf and Country
Club." When appellant requested that the
Board transfer to her the regular family
membership formerly held by her hus-

band, the Board voted to terminate the
membership. At appellant's request, the
Board reconsidered its decision, and again
decided to terminate the membership. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint for
damages and injunctive relief against the
club and its Board, alleging violations of
the Unruh Civil Rights Act and denial of
the right to fair procedure. Following a
trial, the court granted respondent's motion for a directed verdict based upon a
finding that appellant failed to prove the
club's status as a "business establishment"
under the Unruh Act; the court also held
that appellant lacked standing to pursue a
claim for denial of the right to fair procedure.
The First District Court of Appeal affirmed. Noting that the Unruh Civil Rights
Act "prohibits discrimination in the provision of accommodations and services in
all business establishments,'' the court acknowledged that the Act defines the term
"business establishment" in the broadest
sense reasonably possible, to include all
private and public groups or organizations
that may be reasonably found to constitute
business establishments of every type
whatsoever. However, the court found that
truly selective, private organizations are
exempt from scrutiny under the Unruh Act
for discriminatory acts, stating that although no formula-like solution may be
employed to define a business establishment, the functions and characteristics of
the organization must be examined. The
court found that the undisputed evidence
before it established the extremely private
nature of the club, and concluded that the
business activities of the club are inconsequential when compared to the private and
recreational focus of the small, fixed
membership.
Regarding appellant's cause of action
predicated upon denial of the common law
right to fair procedure, the First District
explained that the right of fair procedures
as a component of due process recognizes
that private associations may possess subs tan ti al power either to thwart an
individual's pursuit of a lawful trade or
profession, or to control the terms and
conditions under which it is practiced; accordingly, one may not be expelled from
membership in a private association without compliance with minimum due process requirements. Because appellant enjoyed the benefits and privileges of the
club through her legal right of access to
and use of the facilities, the court found
that appellant had standing to assert her
right to fair procedures associated with her
expulsion from enjoyment of club facilities and exclusion from holding a proprietary membership.
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However, the court stated that the common law requirement of fair procedure does
not compel formal proceedings with all the
embellishments of a court trial, nor adherence to a single mode of process; it may be
satisfied by any one of a variety of procedures which afford a fair opportunity for an
applicant to present his/her position. The
court found that "appellant was not immediately and summarily expelled from the
club and use of its facilities." Based on the
record, the court found that appellant had not
been denied the opportunity to present her
response to the Board's action, and concluded that, "[u]nder the circumstances, we
find no denial of the right to fair procedure."
On March 25, the California Supreme
Court granted appellant's petition for review.

Hull v. Rossi,
13 Cal. App. 4th 1763, 93 D.A.R.
3129, No. B061652 (Mar. 9, 1993).

California's Private Attorney
General Statute Mandates
Attorney Fees Award in
Ballot Proposition Dispute
In this proceeding, appellants Jeffrey
Young and Joanne Miller appeal from denial of their motion for attorneys' fees
under Code of Civil Procedure section
I 021.5, the state's private attorney general
statute; the underlying action involved an
electoral battle concerning the future of
the City of Santa Barbara's water supply.
Appellants signed two ballot arguments
which appeared in the official voters'
pamphlet for the June 4, 1991 special election; their argument supported Measure
"S-91," which advocated development of
a water desalination plant by the City as
an alternative to importation of water from
northern California through the State
Water Project. Appellants' argument
against Measure "T-91" opposed a bond
measure to fund City participation in the
State Water Project.
Respondents are members of "We Want
Water" (WET), which sponsored, funded,
and supported Measure T-91. Respondents
and WET filed a petition for writ of mandate
in the superior court, pursuant to Elections
Code section 5025, seeking to have eighteen
separate statements stricken from
appellants' ballot arguments as "false and
misleading." Respondents' petition for writ
of mandate contained a declaration of James
Stubchaer, a former local water official,
chair of the regional water quality control
board (Central Coast Region), and former
president of the State Water Contractors, an

organization which advises on the administrati on of the State Water Project;
Stubchaer gave his opinion why he found
appellants' ballot arguments "false and
misleading."
Appellants were served with the petition and notice of ex parte hearing scheduled for three o'clock that same afternoon.
Appellants obtained three local environmental attorneys to appear and request
dismissal of the petition. The court refused
to dismiss the petition and ordered appellants to appear for a hearing four days later
to show why the court should not delete
their ballot argument statements under attack. Appellants were required to prepare
and submit their written response within
three days. Appellants' attorneys prepared
their answer to the petition, responsive
memorandum of points and authorities,
responsive declarations, and over 300
pages of exhibits supporting the ballot
arguments. Respondents, over objection, filed
lengthy additional evidentiary materials.
At the hearing, the trial court rejected
fourteen of respondents' claims and ordered minor wording changes in the remaining four statements. Following the
trial court's ruling on respondents' petition for writ of mandate, both sides
claimed victory and sought attorneys' fees
under section 1021.5. The trial court denied both motions, ruling that "no significant benefit was conferred by anybody.
All this was is a temporary media net."
Insofar as respondents' motion was concerned, the court characterized the
changes made in the ballot arguments as
minor, inconsequential, a "piffle," and a
"SLAP" [sic] suit. Concerning both motions, the court stated that it did not think
an important public policy was vindicated
in this particular case; respondents did not
appeal the ruling.
The Second District explained that section I 021.5 allows an award of attorneys'
fees to "a successful party" in an action
which has resulted in the enforcement of
an important right affecting the public interest if a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class
of persons, the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement make the
award appropriate, and such fees should
not in the interest of justice be paid out of
any recovery. The fundamental objective
of the private attorney general theory is to
encourage suits effecting a strong public
policy by awarding attorneys' fees to those
whose successful efforts obtain benefits
for a broad class of citizens.
Appellants asserted that they fully satisfied each of the necessary elements to
entitle them to an award of fees under
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section I 021. 5. They contended they were
the prevailing party and thus met the
threshold requirement of being the "successful party" in the action. Appellants
also noted that a prevailing defendant as
well as a prevailing plaintiff may recover
under section 1021.5, that fees may be
assessed against a private party, that the
action vindicated the public interest in a
full, uncensored ballot argument and in
citizen participation in public debate, and
that the trial court erred in stating, in essence, that any reasonable judge would
have ruled similarly without the extensive
defense undertaken by appellants.
According to the Second District, the
public's right to an accurate impartial analysis under Elections Code section 3781(b)
constitutes an important right within the
meaning of section 1021.5. The Second District also stated that appellants "are correct
that section 1021.5 draws no distinctions
between plaintiffs and defendants as a 'successful party,'" and found that appellants are
equally correct that "[a] prospective private
attorney general should not have to rely on
the prospect that the court will do the right
thing without opposition." Also, the Second
District stated that the trial court need not
rule in favor of petitioners on every single
issue litigated for petitions to be "successful" within the meaning of section 1021.5.
Accordingly, the court held that in defending
the action, appellants achieved a victory that
was substantial and which qualified appellants as prevailing parties under section
1021.5.
In reversing the trial court's holding, the
Second District further recognized that
"[d]enying appellants' request for attorney
fees would have a chilling effect on citizens'
willingness to participate in preparation of
ballot arguments. The awarding of reasonable attorney fees to appellants will discourage the filing of 'SLAP' [sic] lawsuits and
'piffles' which chill the political process."

California Radioactive Materials
Management Forum, et al., v.
Department of Health Services,
et al., Senate Rules Committee,
Real Party In Interest,
15 Cal. App. 4th 841, 93 D.A.R.
5904, No. C013930 (May 7, 1993).

Legislative Committee May Not
Require Formal Hearings in
Agency's Consideration of
License Application
This original writ proceeding arose out
of a dispute over an application for a Ii-
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cense for the construction and operation
of a low-level radioactive waste disposal
facility in Ward Valley near the City of
Needles in the southern California desert.
The petitioners challenged an order of the
Department of Health Services (OHS) for
administrative proceedings in a formal adjudicatory mode in connection with the
application of US Ecology, Inc., for the
license in question. Petitioners are US
Ecology and diverse individuals and
groups with asserted interests in ensuring
the timely construction and operation of
the facility.
According to the court, OHS had already conducted "exhaustive administrative proceedings" on the pending license
application and OHS itself believed the
proposed adjudicatory proceeding was
unnecessary. Nonetheless, OHS notified
US Ecology that it must submit to a new
adjudicatory proceeding conducted under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
Government Code section I 1340 et seq.
Petitioners contended that the order for
formal adjudicatory proceedings was the
result of unlawful coercion by members of
the Senate Rules Committee during the
confirmation hearings of Health and Welfare Agency Secretary Russell Gould and
Director of Health Services Molly Coye;
the Senate Rules Committee admitted that
it obtained an agreement for further administrative proceedings from Gould and
Coye during the confirmation process but
characterized the agreement as a legally
proper compromise between two branches
of government.
In concluding that the Senate Rules
Committee's interference in the administration of the law was unconstitutional and
that the purported agreement with the administrative officers was void, the Third
District Court of Appeal stated that relevant provisions of the state's Radiation
Control Law expressly provided for compliance with APA procedures with respect
to rulemaking and in connection with adverse action against a licensee, but not in
connection with granting or amending a
license. Further, the court stated that it will
not imply a requirement of an APA-type
adjudicatory hearing for granting or issuing a license, noting that where the legislature has carefully employed a term or
phrase in one place and has excluded it in
another, it should not be implied where
excluded. Therefore, the court concluded
that the proposed hearings are not statutorily required.
The court then addressed "the real
issue in this case, namely, whether respondents are required to proceed with a formal
adjudicatory hearing based upon a purported agreement extracted from nomin228
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ees during the confirmation process. That
this agreement is the sole reason for
[OHS'] intention to proceed with a formal
adjudicatory hearing is beyond question."
The Senate Rules Committee asserted that
the validity of the agreement for further
hearings presented a nonjusticiable political question; it emphasized its view that
the agreement was not coerced but was
simply the result of negotiation between
the legislative and executive branches of
government. In rejecting this contention,
the Third District found that the issues in
this case do not involve a political question committed to the determination of the
legislature, but instead involve an unconstitutional usurpation of legislative and
executive authority by the Senate Rules
Committee. "By injecting itself into the
process and in attempting to force [OHS]
to conduct the type of hearings it desired,
the Senate Rules Committee usurped to
powers of not one but two branches of
government." The court noted that the
Senate Rules Committee is one committee
of one house of the legislature; its authority is subsidiary and auxiliary to the legislative functions of the Senate, and the
legislature may not constitutionally delegate legislative authority to one house and
certainly may not delegate its authority to
a committee. According to the court, to do
so would violate the bicameral and presentment clauses of the California constitution. Here, the court found that the
legislature did not purport to delegate supervisory authority over the Radiation
Control Law to the Senate Rules Committee; instead, the committee assumed that
power for itself. In doing so, the Third
District concluded that the committee
acted without legislative authorization
and in a manner which would be unconstitutional and void even if the legislature
had purported to delegate such authority.
Further, the Third District found that
the Senate Rules Committee's action also
usurped the power of the executive in violation of the separation of powers provision of the California constitution; having
enacted a statutory scheme, the legislature
has no power to exercise supervisorial
control or to retain for itself some sort of
"veto" power over the manner of execution of the laws. Having granted authority
to OHS to execute the provisions of the
Radiation Control Law, the legislature
"must abide by its delegation of authority
until that delegation is legislatively altered
or revoked" by statute in accordance with
the bicameral and presentment requirements of the state constitution.
Accordingly, the court found that the
Senate Rules Committee's assertion that
the Director and Secretary's agreement to

conduct formal adjudicatory hearings was
the result of a legally proper compromise
during the confirmation process is mistaken. According to the court, nothing in
the appointive process suggests that the
Senate may exact promises or agreements
from nominees as to the manner of performance of their duties; rather, the state constitution provides an oath which, among
other things, requires that officers swear
or affirm to well and faithfully discharge
the duties of office. Although the legislature may dictate the manner of execution
of the laws by enacting a statute in accordance with the bicameral and presentment
requirements of the state constitution, it
may not otherwise exercise supervisorial
control over the performance of the duties
of an officer.
Finally, the court addressed the
Committee's claim that although the
agreement for further hearings originated
with the committee, the Governor's inclusion of funds for the proposed hearings in
the Budget Act validated the agreement.
According to the court, the Governor's
request for and approval of funding for the
proposed hearings does not represent a
shift in his consistent position that the
agreement was unlawful ·and the hearings
unnecessary, noting that "[i]t would be
foolhardy for an executive officer to fail
to plan for contingencies, and that is all the
Governor has done. In any event, the Governor can no more concede executive
power to a legislative committee than a
committee can be permitted to usurp it.
And the Governor's consent to an unlawful legislative act does not validate the
act."
Accordingly, the court granted extraordinary relief requiring OHS to proceed
with consideration of US Ecology's license application without regard to or
consideration of the invalid agreement
with the Senate Rules Committee.
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